I. INTRODUCTION
Arms control as a significant technical discipline emerged in the 1950s and 1960s out of a growing realization of the profound dangers posed by the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race and the threat of nuclear war. A clear early expression of this perspective was provided by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin in a seminal 1961 work, Strategy and Arms Control ͑Ref. 100͒, in which they proposed that "arms control … rests essentially on the recognition that our military relation with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs." ͑p. 1͒
The goal of arms control became to find mutually agreeable, often incremental steps that would curtail the arms race while maintaining stability, and so reduce tensions and build confidence among the superpowers. The search for such steps created an important channel for dialogue between the superpowers, even during crises. It was also a way for governments of both superpowers to reassure their domestic publics and the international community that they too were concerned about the need to reduce the costs, risks, and consequences of their very large arsenals, and attendant nuclear postures, strategies, and policies. The need to discuss armscontrol measures created an important channel for dialogue between the superpowers.
Efforts to agree on limits on the sizes of the nuclear arsenals have been largely confined to the United States and the Soviet Union, now Russia. The other nuclear-armed states bound by the 1970 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty ͑NPT͒ to eliminate their weapons-Britain, France, and Chinahave either taken unilateral arms-control steps or joined multinational arms-control treaties that also include non-nuclear weapons states. They have not yet engaged in arms-control talks with the United States and Russia on reductions in arsenals. It is widely assumed that this will have to happen when the United States and Russia reduce their arsenals to 1000 warheads or fewer.
There are several abiding issues that have been the concern of the nuclear arms-control community for the past half century and will be the focus of this Resource Letter. The first is to understand and explain the effects of nuclear weapons and to limit their further development through a ban on nuclear testing. A limited ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, at sea, and in space was agreed to in 1963. This largely dissipated the public opposition to nuclear testing, which had focused in particular on the large releases of radioactivity that accompanied above-ground testing. Nuclear testing continued below ground. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, banning all nuclear tests, was negotiated in 1996. It has not yet entered into force. However, there are questions about how significant a constraint this treaty is on the development of new nuclear weapons by states with advanced weapons programs.
A second major concern has been to control the production of fissile material-highly enriched uranium and plutonium-for nuclear weapons. The U.N. General Assembly in 1957 proposed a treaty that would have ended the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and limited all future production to nonweapons purposes under international control. However, a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty has not yet been negotiated, although most nuclear-armed states stopped production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons some time ago.
The development of ballistic missiles able to carry nuclear weapons over intercontinental distances in a few tens of minutes created a new sense of vulnerability, dramatically changed the dynamics of the nuclear arms race, and engendered efforts to create missile defenses. The search for defenses led in turn to a search for countermeasures, including mounting multiple warheads on ballistic missiles and multiple cruise missiles on bombers to overwhelm defenses. Arms-control analysts have sought to offer a way out of this spiral by showing the limited efficacy of defensive systems.
The mistrust between the United States and the Soviet Union strengthened by their respective nuclear arsenals and policies, ensured that a critical challenge for arms-control agreements has been the question of verification. While many technical options may exist for determining compliance with any particular commitment, their feasibility is typically constrained by the interests of each state in keeping secret the information on their nuclear weapons and capabilities. Policy makers, nuclear-weapons bureaucracies, and military leaders have at times exaggerated security concerns as a way to prevent arms control.
The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, now almost 20 years ago, transformed the global landscape for arms control. In the absence of confrontation, armscontrol critics in the United States in particular felt that there was no longer a need to accept constraints on strategic capabilities. For many people, the end of the Cold War meant an end to the nuclear arms race and the lifting of the threat of nuclear war. These factors led to a reduced interest in arms control and nuclear disarmament, despite that the United States and Russia retain over 10,000 nuclear weapons each, with many deployed on hair-trigger alert and large stocks of fissile materials; in both countries there are calls for new kinds of nuclear weapons.
Recently, however, interest has grown again in arms control and the urgent need to chart a path to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This has been due in large part to the belated recognition among the arms-control community and U.S. policy makers-laid out most clearly in a January 2007 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn-that unless there is a global ban on nuclear weapons "the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence."
This new sensibility among policy makers is a response to proliferation of nuclear-weapons programs over the past two decades to third-world states, most notably Iraq, North Korea, and possibly Iran, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, the need to secure fissile materials and expertise from the former Soviet Union's nuclear-weapons complex, and, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist groups. There is a rich literature on these issues, but much of it is of a nontechnical nature or is country specific. It is not referenced at length in this Resource Letter. Instead, we focus on introducing basic ideas about the science and technology that underlies all such nuclear-weapons programs and the monitoring of nuclear activities.
There are a number of crucial areas where there has been little effort at arms control; these are not discussed here. There are agreements to limit the numbers of deployed systems, but there has been no significant progress in controlling or eliminating entire classes of delivery systems. This is despite that the stated goal of the 1970 NPT is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. Similarly, apart from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banning the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit, on celestial bodies, or in outer space, there have been no constraints on the military uses of space. There are now concerns about U.S. plans to place weapons in space and develop the capacity to wage war from space-based platforms. This will likely become an active area of future arms-control research.
Two earlier Resource Letters overlap some of the topics covered here, as follows: vast literature over the past 60 years. Some of the basic requirements for thinking systematically about arms control are knowledge about the development and status of nuclearweapons programs, the technologies and processes associated with them, and the repertoire of arms-control ideas, agreements, and technical options. 
IV. SPECIFIC TOPICS
References on specific topics are categorized as follows: nuclear weapons, fissile materials, missiles and missile defenses, arms-control verification, disarmament, and the role of scientists in the arms-control process.
A. Nuclear weapons
This Resource Letter largely omits references on the history of nuclear weapons, their development, and their military and political significance during and after the Cold War. There is an extensive and important literature on the histories of all major nuclear-weapons programs, and in particular on the U.S. Manhattan Project. The reader may refer to the aforementioned "Resource Letters MP-1: The Manhattan Project and related nuclear research" and "PNAR-1: Physics and the Arms Race" for a comprehensive collection of references on this specific topic. , that is before the high spontaneous-fission rate of plutonium was discovered, which required the development of the implosion method. It includes a derivation of expressions to estimate the yield of a nuclear weapon. ͑A͒ 25. "Estimate of the critical mass of a fissionable isotope," E. Derringh, Am. J. Phys. 58͑4͒, 363-364 ͑1990͒. This short article presents a simple analytical method for estimating a bare spherical critical mass ͑the amount of material needed to sustain a nuclear-chain reaction͒, using uranium-235 as the numerical example. ͑E, I͒ 26. "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium," J. C. Mark, F. von Hippel, and E. Lyman, Sci. Global Secur. 4͑1͒, 111-124 ͑1993͒. Coauthored by the former director of the Theoretical Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory, J. C. Mark, this article shows that reactor-grade plutonium can be used to construct a nuclear explosive device-a fact that had been long disputed. An appendix details how the probable yield of a plutonium-based nuclear-weapon detonation depends upon the isotopic composition. ͑A͒ 27. "Third Generation Nuclear Weapons," T. B. Taylor, Sci. Am. 256͑4͒, 30-39 ͑1987͒. A preeminent U.S. nuclear-weapons designer explores the possibilities for new types of nuclear weapons that selectively enhance certain energy types and direct destructive power in specific directions. Also includes a valuable description of nuclear-weapon physics. ͑I͒
Atomic Energy for

The Curve of Binding Energy: A Journey into the Awesome and
Alarming World of Theodore B. Taylor, J. McPhee ͑Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1974͒. An easy-to-read introduction to the life and work of a nuclear-weapons designer, with descriptions of some key ideas in nuclear-weapons design and effects, and the need for controls. ͑E, I͒
Effects
The destructive effects of nuclear weapons are difficult to convey. Detailed descriptions of the physical effects, but generally also discussions of biological, medical, or societal effects of nuclear explosions, are insufficient to do so. Yet, the literature-and the list below is no exception-focuses almost exclusively on these phenomena. To account for and emphasize the human dimensions of nuclear-weapon use, we include personal and literary accounts of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Nuclear Weapon Tests
Historically, testing has been a critical element of the development process of new nuclear-weapon designs. Limiting or prohibiting nuclear testing has therefore long been recognized as an effective arms-control measure. Respective efforts culminated in the negotiation of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ͑CTBT͒. As of June 2007, the treaty has been signed by 177 and ratified by 138 states. The treaty cannot enter into force until a group of 44 states considered to have nuclear-weapon-relevant expertise ratify it. So far, only 38 of these have done so. The United States has signed but not ratified the CTBT and is debating a program to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons that, proponents argue, may not need to be tested before deployment. 1͑3-4͒ , 187-223, ͑1990͒. An assessment of three nuclear-weapons concepts ͑x-ray lasers, nuclear kinetic-energy weapons, and nuclear microwave weapons͒ and how their development could be limited by a nuclearweapons test ban that permitted very low-yield tests. ͑A͒
Seismic Verification of Nuclear
constrained by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. ͑A͒ 50. "The Effects of Nuclear Test-Ban Regimes on Third-GenerationWeapon Innovation," D. L. Fenstermacher, Sci. Global Secur.
B. Fissile Materials
Fissile materials are nuclear materials that can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction. They are required for all nuclear-weapon designs, from first-generation fission weapons to modern thermonuclear weapons. The most common fissile materials are plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and controlling these materials can play an important role in nuclear arms control. In this context, technical analysis is required to estimate historic or current production capabilities, to verify nondiversion or nonproduction of fissile material, and to identify viable disposition strategies for existing stocks. 
General
Production
Production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium is based upon two fundamentally different processes. Plutonium can be produced in dedicated production reactors, typically fueled with natural uranium, but is also generated as a by-product during routine operation of commercial reactors. Highly enriched uranium can be produced using isotopeseparation techniques, in which the U-235 is enriched to very high fractions ͑typically 90% and higher compared to 0.7% in natural uranium or to 4%-5% in low-enriched fuel used for most power reactors͒.
overview of plutonium production in nuclear reactors and uranium enrichment on an elementary level. ͑E͒ 55. Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation, A. S. 
Disposition of Fissile Materials
Disposition of fissile materials first became an issue with the end of the Cold War, when the United States and Russia began to declare large amounts of highly enriched uranium ͑HEU͒ and weapon-grade plutonium as exceeding their military needs. Fissile materials are also present in the civilian nuclear fuel cycle and therefore risk diversion or theft of the material by state or substate actors. Two cases are most relevant: the use of highly enriched uranium to fuel research reactors and the separation of plutonium from spent fuel in order to fabricate it into nuclear fuel. In principle, disposition of HEU is technically straightforward and economically attractive because it can be blended-down to low enrichment and be used as fuel in nuclear-power plants. Plutonium disposition, on the contrary, is costly and has proven difficult to implement. 
"Global
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
The idea of a treaty requiring the "cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes" goes back to a 1957 resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. A related resolution adopted in 1993 recommended beginning negotiations of such a treaty. It has been stalled at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Draft treaty texts tabled by Non-Governmental Organizations ͑NGOs͒ or individual governments are collected at the website of the International Panel on Fissile Materials ͗www.fissilematerials.org͘. 
Nuclear Proliferation
The dual-use character of nuclear technology has been recognized from the outset of the atomic era. Since then, analysts have debated the relative importance of the political and technical dimensions of the proliferation process. The discussion is relevant to arms-control efforts, in particular because it will play an important role in the process of strengthening the nonproliferation regime and in negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty. and reprinted in Sci. Global Securi., 13͑1-2͒, 118-128 ͑2005͒. A remarkable essay by one of the most prominent former U.S. weapon designers. Based upon the arguments of latent proliferation and the threat of radiological terrorism, the author makes the case for abolition of nuclear weapons-but also for a simultaneous global phase-out of nuclear energy. ͑E͒
C. Missiles and missile defenses
The development of missiles as delivery systems for nuclear weapons in the late 1950s and 1960s was seen as transforming the nature of modern strategy and warfare. A wide variety of ballistic missiles have been developed, from short-range battlefield missiles to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles ͑ICBMs͒ having ranges up to 10,000-15,000 km that can be based in silos, on mobile launchers, or on submarines. Ground-launched, sea-launched, and aircraftlaunched cruise missiles, which rely on a jet engine rather than a rocket engine for propulsion, also have become nuclear-weapons delivery systems. A particular concern about ICBMs has been their very short flight times and their utility for a nuclear first strike ͑or preemptive attack͒. This has led in turn to dangerous strategies that rely on keeping missiles on high alert, so they can be launched quickly in case of warning of an attack.
The threat from missiles has led to a persistent search for missile defenses. The arms-control community was able to show in the 1960s that there were simple countermeasures to mid-course defenses against long-range ballistic missiles, which paved the way for the 1973 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The search for missile defenses was revived in the United States a decade later under President Reagan, as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative ͑SDI, also "Star Wars" program͒, which featured orbiting interceptor missiles and lasers. It was again effectively critiqued by arms controllers and shelved. However, in December 2001, the United States announced its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and began to deploy a national missile defense system putatively to protect against possible future long-range missile attacks from Iran and North Korea. This has created considerable concern among Chinese policy makers, who see the U.S. efforts as threatening the relatively small number of Chinese missiles able to reach the United States. The threat of shorter-range missiles that would threaten U.S. expeditionary forces fighting overseas has also led to the development of theater missile defenses, which were first deployed in Western Europe and which are now being exported to other allies. These developments pose continuing challenges to the arms-control community.
Ballistic Missiles
Rocket Propulsion Elements: An Introduction to the Engineering
of Rockets, G. P. Sutton and O. Biblarz, 7th ed. ͑Wiley-Interscience, New York, 2000͒. This is the classic reference for understanding propulsion systems using both liquid and solid fuels. ͑I, A͒ 74. "Free flight of a ballistic missile," A. D. Wheelon, ARS J. 29͑12͒, 915-926 ͑1959͒. This is the classic paper that describes the motion of an object under the influence of gravity for a nonrotating, spherical earth. The second part of the paper includes corrections to take into account the earth's rotation, oblateness, and other effects. 
Missile Defenses
83. "Anti-ballistic-missile systems," R. Garwin and H. Bethe, Sci. Am.
218͑3͒, 21-31 ͑1968͒. The classic early paper discussing technical issues related to ballistic-missile defense and countermeasures. ͑E͒ 84. "Space-based Ballistic-Missile Defense," H. A. Bethe, R. L. Garwin, K. 
D. Arms control verification
The hostility between the superpowers during the Cold War, the great destructive power of nuclear weapons, and the relatively closed character of the Soviet system led to concern about the question of verification of any agreement. Progress on a number of arms-control treaties was stalled for many years because of a perceived lack of adequate verification. Demonstrating that a treaty would be verifiable became an important arms-control challenge. The superpowers developed sophisticated capacities for surveillance, known as national technical means, but also managed to agree on systems of inspections. There are particularly important technical tradeoffs posed by the transparency required by inspection systems and the need felt by participating states to keep secret information about the design, numbers, and capabilities of nuclear-weapons and delivery systems.
The most wide-ranging system of international nuclear monitoring covers the production of fissile materials and is associated with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ͑NPT͒. Managed by the International Atomic Energy Agency ͑IAEA͒, it seeks to provide assurance that civilian nuclear facilities and materials are not being used for weapons purposes. It is likely to play an important role in any verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. 
E. Disarmament
The first U.N. General Assembly Resolution ͑Resolution 1.1, 24 January 1946͒ called for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." The goals of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation were formally linked in the 1970 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty ͑NPT͒. The United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China are all parties and required by the treaty "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." Nuclear arms control is now widely seen as an incremental approach involving negotiated limits and reductions on nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles that seeks to even-tually achieve the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Both chemical and biological weapons have already been prohibited by international conventions. 1945-1953, 1954-1970, and 1971-2002, respectively . ͑E, I͒ 104. The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy ͑National Academy, Washington, DC, 1997͒. This report described the state of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and policies, and made a case for reduction in warhead numbers from 10,000 each to 1000 each and then to a few hundred each. It considers the conditions under which a global prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons might become possible and the means to achieve this goal. 
V. WEBSITES AND BLOGS
There are many government and nongovernment websites and a small number of blogs on nuclear weapons, arms control, and nonproliferation. However, the past few years have seen a return to greater secrecy by government about nuclear information after a period of unprecedented openness in the 1990s, and a great deal of information is no longer as easily available online.
The list below contains websites of independent armscontrol groups and international organizations working in the area. It does not include a guide to government departments or national laboratories working on nuclear-weapon issues. We also include a few blogs that have emerged as important resources for the arms-control community.
